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PUBLIC LAW
ADMIRALTY
Frank L. Maraist*
JURISDICTION OVER MARITIME TORTS

Under early American maritime law, a tort did not fall within
the admiralty jurisdiction unless it had "locality," i.e., it must have
occurred on navigable waters.' Under the rule, a tort occurred
where the negligence of the defendant took effect upon the person
or property of the plaintiff. One recurring fact situation in which
the rule did not work properly was when a vessel collided with a
pier; since the pier was an "extension of land," the vessel's tort
claim was "in admiralty," but the wharfinger's claim was not.' To
remedy this, Congress in 1948 passed the Admiralty Extension Act,
which provides that "the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . .
shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person
or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding
that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.' Since
the passage of the Act, maritime tort law has evolved to a point at
which "locality alone" is not enough to bring a tort into admiralty;
the delict now must have both "locality" and "maritime flavor," i e.,
it must "bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."' The broad language of the Admiralty Extension Act, and the
subsequent development of the "locality plus flavor" test, has raised
another problem: if the damage is caused by a vessel on navigable
waters, does it fall within admiralty, under the language of the Act,
even though it does not have the "maritime flavor" otherwise required for maritime torts? The point is a narrow but important one,
because pleasure boats are vessels, and many torts involving
pleasure boats arguably do not have maritime flavor.' The Supreme
Court has not spoken to the issue, and the lower courts are substan*
1.
2.
3.
(1908).
4.
5.
6.

Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
E.g., The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
Id. See also T. Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
E.g., Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. Co. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316
46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976).
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-10, at 30-31

(2d ed. 1975); 2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 2, at 1-16 n.26 (7th ed. 1975 & Supp. 1980).
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tially divided.' The Fifth Circuit has joined those courts holding that
a tort caused by a vessel on navigable waters is not brought within
admiralty jurisdiction through the Admiralty Extension Act unless
it has the requisite "maritime flavor." Reaching this conclusion in
Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co.,'
Senior Judge John Brown, one of admiralty's most articulate spokesmen, observed that the Admiralty Extension Act "was not intended
to grant claimants new substantive rights of recovery nor relieve
them from jurisdictional constraints unrelated to locality-a la Executive Jet-imposed on general maritime tort claimants."9
Proponents of the position that pleasure boating accidents have
"maritime flavor" received support from a number of sources during
the recent year. Of most significance to Louisiana lawyers were the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Richardson v. Foremost Insurance Co.,1"
and the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in McCraine v.
Hondo Boats, Inc." In Richardson,' the court, without elaboration,
held that a collision between two pleasure boats has maritime
flavor. The more difficult question of whether maritime flavor exists
when the accident involves a single passenger vessel was presented
in McCraine. A passenger in a pleasure boat, injured when it accelerated and struck the wake of another vessel, brought a products
liability suit against the manufacturer of the boat. The Louisiana
Supreme Court found that the accident was within the maritime jurisdiction, thereby allowing the plaintiff to avoid the ban of the
state's one year statute of limitations. There are recent decisions to
the contrary, however. 2
Even if a pleasure boating accident has "maritime flavor," it
may not fall within admiralty if the water on which it occurs is "nonnavigable." The test for the navigability of waters is ancient and
venerable, but its application is sometimes difficult. Waters are
"navigable" for the purpose of maritime jurisdiction if they are
navigable in fact, and they are navigable in fact

7. For cases holding there is no jurisdiction, see Jorsch v. LeBeau, 449 F. Supp.
485 (N.D. I1. 1978); Roberts v. Grammer, 432 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Complaint
of Cook Transp. Sys., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 437 (W.D. Tenn. 1976). But see Saint Hilaire
Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 979 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974): "All
that is required for the Act to come into involvement is injury caused by a vessel on
navigable waters." Cf. Gebhard v. Steamship Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303, 1307
(9th Cir. 1970).
8. 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981).

9. Id. at 1136.
10. 641 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1981).
11. 399 So. 2d 163 (La. 1981).
12. See Hall v. Robinson, 495 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
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[if] they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade
and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of
the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in
contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when
they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water."3
An essential element of the test is commercial use. Some courts
have required present commercial use, or capability of such use,
while others have concluded that waters once navigable remain as
such, even though they no longer are capable of use for commercial
purposes." The Fifth Circuit apparently adopted the former, and
now majority view, in Richardson v. Foremost Insurance Co.'" The
Richardson court observed that "U]urisdiction should be as readily
ascertainable as courts can make it. If the waterway is capable of
being used in commerce, that is a sufficient threshold to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.""'
SEAMEN'S REMEDIES
To qualify as a seaman, a worker must either be "permanently
assigned" to a vessel, or must perform a significant amount of his
work aboard a vessel. 7 The tests are alternatives; a worker who is
"permanently assigned" to a non-vessel may qualify as a seaman if
he performs a significant part of his work on a vessel.'" One worker
who has been most difficult to classify is one who, when injured, was
doing most or all of his work aboard a vessel, but whose work by its
nature would have been completed in a short period of time. Such a
case reached the Fifth Circuit in its last term. In Roberts v.
Williams-McWilliams Co., Inc.,"9 the plaintiff was hired by a labor
13. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
14. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at § 1-11; 1 BENEDICT,
supra note 6, at § 143.

15. 641 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1981).
16. Id. at 316. For a case holding that Lake Bistineau in north Louisiana is nonnavigable, see Smith v. Hustler, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. La. 1981). The court

there applied the same test as embraced by the Fifth Circuit in Richardson.
17. Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959).
18. Longmire v. Sea Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980); Davis v. Hill
Eng'r Inc., 549 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1977); Keener v. Transworld Drilling Co., 468 F.2d
729 (5th Cir. 1972).

19. 648 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1981).
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service company that supplied welders to drilling companies; some
of the drilling companies did offshore work. On the day after he was
hired, plaintiff was sent to a drilling barge and sustained injury
shortly thereafter (apparently the next day). The Fifth Circuit,
reversing the trial court, found that the plaintiff was entitled to
seaman's status as a matter of law. The basis of the decision is not
clear. The court observed, in successive sentences of its opinion,
that plaintiff would have qualified as a seaman either if (1) his
assignment aboard the drilling barge was for an indefinite time, or
(2) his assignment was to encompass the length of the barge's mission."
If his assignment was for an indefinite period, he clearly was not
permanently assigned elsewhere; the only place which could be his
permanent place of assignment was the barge. Similarly, one would
not doubt that a "bluewater" seaman who signs on for a voyage of
several days would qualify as a seaman. The analogy is obvious; if
the work of a "brownwater" seaman encompasses the entire period
of the mission of the vessel, he should qualify as a seaman, no matter
how brief the mission.
Punitive damages are not unknown to maritime law. Since the
3
Supreme Court's decision in Vaughan v. Atkinson,"
punitive
damages have been available for willful failure to provide maintenance and cure, although some courts have limited such damages to
attorney's fees. The Second Circuit has authorized the award of
punitive damages for "gross negligence, or actual malice or criminal
indifference which is the equivalent of reckless and wanton misconduct"; 2 the Sixth Circuit has sanctioned such damages for unseaworthiness, ie., "the acts . . . of an unfit master . . . [whose] owner
was reckless in employing him." 23 In In re Merry Shipping,' the
Fifth Circuit has ruled that punitive damages may be awarded
under the general maritime law upon a showing of "willful and wanton
misconduct" by a shipowner in creating or maintaining an unseaworthy
condition. Counsel for the shipowner argued that punitive damages
were not recoverable under the Jones Act, and hence could not be
awarded for unseaworthiness where that claim was joined with a
Jones Act claim. The court, sidestepping the issue of whether
punitive damages would be available under the Jones Act, ruled
that even if such damages were not recoverable under the Act, they

20. Id at 262.

21. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
22. In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
982 (1972).
23. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1969).
24. 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
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nevertheless could be awarded in an unseaworthiness claim joined
with a Jones Act claim.
MARITIME WORKERS: LSHWCA
A maritime employer owes Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act benefits only to those of his employees
who are within the coverage of the Act. Essential to the application
of the Act are both an employment relationship between the claimant and the person from whom benefits are sought, and a workrelated injury which meets the jurisdictional requirements of the
Act. Prior to 1972, "jurisdiction" hinged in part on whether the
employer was a covered employer; a claim fell within the Act if the
claimant was injured on navigable waters and either he, or some
other employee of his employer, was engaged in maritime employment.25 Under the 1972 amendments, the claimant must himself be
engaged in maritime employment." If he is so engaged, is there any
additional requirement which his employer must meet as a prerequisite to jurisdiction under the Act? Apparently not, if one reads
literally the definition of an "employer" provided in section 902(4),
i.e., one "any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment .. ." within a covered "situs." The United States Fifth Circuit
now rules that there is no longer a separate jurisdictional requirement that the employer be a "maritime employer." In Hullinghorst
Industries, Inc. v. Carroll," the court observed that the "employer"
status requirement in the pre-1972 Act has been rendered "largely
tautological" by the amendments. The amendments provide that
once a determination is made that the claimant is a maritime
employee under 33 U.S.C. § 902(3), it "necessarily follows that ... his
employer . . . is a statutory 'employer' within the meaning of the
Act."'
33 U.S.C. § 903 makes compensation payable under the
LSHWCA only if the injury occurs
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine
railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer
in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)."
The "other adjoining area" need not abut navigable waters; it is sufficient if it adjoins a pier, wharf, or similar structure which in turn
25. 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (1970) (amended 1972).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976).
27. 650 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
28. Id. at 758, 759.
29. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1976).
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adjoins navigable waters." But, must the area be contiguous to the
"adjoining pier, wharf" or similar structure? Some early cases have
required contiguity between the two areas. The better view, however, espoused by the Ninth,31 Fourth,"2 and Third 3 Circuits is that it
suffices if the "other adjoining area," although it does not abut an
"area adjoining navigable waters," is located as close to the water's
edge as is practicable under all of the prevailing conditions. The
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, has rejected the contiguity requirement.u Writing for the majority in a substantially divided court
(eight dissented among the twenty-three judges participating),
Judge Fay observed that "[the character of surrounding properties
is but one factor to be considered .... All circumstances must be
examined .... The site must have some nexus with the waterfront,
[but] . . . [slo long as the site is close to or in the vicinity of

navigable waters, or in a neighboring area, an employee's injury can
come within the [LSHWCAJ." '8 The majority also noted that the
statute does not require that the "adjoining area" be used exclusively
for maritime work by the claimant's employer, so long as the area is
customarily used for significant maritime activity by any statutory
employer. The key in these cases, of course, is whether a maritime
employer has fair notice that he may be liable to any employee for
LSHWCA benefits, so that he may obtain proper insurance coverage
and make an informed decision on whether to participate in the activity which may give rise to the application of the Act. If any of his
employees work on navigable waters or on an adjoining pier, this
"fair notice" requirement ordinarily will be satisfied. As the work
area is located farther away from the water's edge, the employer's
constructive knowledge may be lessened, depending in part upon
the type of work in which his employees are there engaged, and the
type of work being carried on by others in the same area. In such a
"fair notice" test, contiguity is a factor to be considered, but it obviously should not be conclusive, unless the courts opt for a test
which is certain over one which is less certain, but more logical, in
the light of the Congressional aim.
Does the acceptance of benefits under a state workers' compensation system bar subsequent recovery of benefits under the Long30. E.g., Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. v. Kininess, 554 F.2d 176 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977).
31. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1978).
32. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Graham, 573 F.2d 167 (4th Cir.
1978).
33. Dravo Corp. v. Maxin, 545 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1976).
34. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980).
35. Id. at 513, 514.
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shoremens' and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act? Most state
worker's compensation laws provide that acceptance of benefits
under the Act shall constitute the employee's exclusive remedy
against the employer;"0 thus one might argue that a subsequent
award of benefits under another act, such as the LSHWCA, from the
same employer for the same work-related injury may deny the state
statute the "full faith and credit" to which it is entitled under the
Constitution. The issue has not been an easy one, and has provoked
three inconclusive and seemingly conflicting decisions from the
Supreme Court." In the latest case of significance, the Fifth Circuit,
interpreting the Supreme Court decisions, adopts the test in Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin that "absent unmistakable language" in the state worker's compensation act or the
cases construing it, making recovery under the state act a final adjudication of all claims which possibly could arise from the injury,
one may recover under the LSHWCA without denying full faith and
credit to the state statute.38 Having reached this conclusion, the
Fifth Circuit then struck terror in the hearts of defense counsel
with this additional observation: where subsequent recovery under
the LSHWCA is permitted, the employer or his insurer is entitled
to a credit for the prior payments under the state act, but only to
the extent that the claimant actually received the funds. Furthermore, that portion of the award under the state act which was allocated to attorney's fees should not be deducted from the claimant's
recovery under the federal compensation plan."'
MARITIME WORKERS: THIRD PARTY CLAIMS
In Seas Shipping Co., Inc., v. Sieracki4 the United States
Supreme Court held that a non-seaman aboard a vessel doing the
work of a member of the crew was entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness from the vessel and its operator. The greatest beneficiaries of the Sieracki doctrine were the longshoremen, the ship
repairer, and other harbor workers whose claims against their employers for work-related injuries fell within the coverage of the
LSHWCA. Such workers were entitled to recover LSHWCA benefits from their employers, but also could maintain an action for tort
36. See generally 2A A.

LARSON,

THE

LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§

65.00

& 65.10 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
37. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.. 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Industrial Comm'n
of Wis. v. McCartin. 330 U.S. 622 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430

(1943).
38. Landry v. Carlson Mooring Serv.. 643 F.2d 1080, 1085 (5th Cir. 1981).
39. Id. at 1088.
40. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
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damages against the vessel on which they were injured, if the injury
was caused by a condition of the vessel. From 1946 to 1972, suits by
"Sieracki seamen" against vessels provided much grist for the
maritime judicial mill. In the latter year, Congress, in enacting comprehensive amendments to the LSHWCA, provided that "[in the
event of injury to a person covered under this chapter . . . [t]he
liability of the vessel . . . shall not be based upon the warranty of
seaworthiness or a breach thereof ....
This language has been

viewed by some as a Congressional death sentence for the Sieracki
seaman."2 If this was Congress' intent, its language leaves much to
be desired; that language only abolishes the warranty of seaworthiness for those workers covered by the LSHWCA, but there are significant groups of workers who fall within the Sieracki definition
but not within the coverage of the LSHWCA. Some examples are
federal and state employees, workers covered by state worker's
compensation, and workers whose injuries occur beyond American
territorial waters and the Outer Continental Shelf.'3 Do these
workers retain their claims for unseaworthiness after the 1972
amendments? The verdict is not yet in. A majority of the lower
courts which have faced the issue have held that Congress intended
total abolition of the Sieracki seaman; these courts find support in
dicta in a recent Supreme Court decision." An impressive minority,
however, have concluded that section 905 means exactly what it
says, and no more. ' s
Since the 1972 amendments, a worker covered by the LSHWCA
41.

33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).

42. E.g., G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, at § 6-57, at 449.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)(1), (2) (1976).
44. See Normile v. Maritime Co. of the Philippines, 643 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir.
1981) ("no longshoreman, whether publicly or privately employed, can bring an unseaworthiness action"); Grice v. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels, 477 F. Supp. 365 (S.D. Ala.
1979) (longshoreman injured in Saudi Arabia had no unseaworthiness action); Quinn v.
Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 119771 Am. Mar. Cases 204 (D. Md.) (no unseaworthiness action
for a federal employee). See also Edmonds v. Compagnie Generate Transalantique,443
U.S. 256, 262 (1979), where the Court observed that "Congress acted in 1972 . . . to
eliminate the shipowner's liability to the longshoreman for unseaworthiness and the
stevedore's liability to the shipowner for unworkmanlike service resulting in injury to
the longshoreman-in other words, to overrule Sieracki and Ryan.").
45. See Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1118 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (opinion
by Rubin, J.) ("Until Congress abrogates the remedies created by the Supreme Court
as they apply to maritime workers not covered by the LSHWCA, those workers remain entitled to relief and their employers and vessel owners remain bound by the
Sieracki-Ryan doctrine.") (dicta to the holding that a maritime worker covered by
FECA has an unseaworthiness action). See also Pinto v. Vessel "Santa Isabel," 492 F.
Supp. 689 (D. C.Z. 1980); Guevara v. Cia Sud Americana de Vapores, 119771 2 Am. Mar.
Cases 2000 (D. C.Z. 1978).
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may maintain a negligence action against the vessel on which he is
injured. In substituting this negligence action for the prior Sieracki
warranty of seaworthiness, Congress did not prescribe the standard
of care which is owed by the vessel to the maritime worker; instead,
it left to the courts the task of formulating the applicable rules. The
legislative history of section 905(b) does reflect Congress' intent that
the courts should impose upon the vessel owner a duty similar to
that owed by a landowner under prevailing state law. The difficulty with Congress' approach is that no consensus exists among the
state jurisdictions as to the duty which a landowner owes to the
employees of an independent contractor who enter the land to do
work pursuant to a contract between the landowner and the independent contractor. The lower courts, in applying section 905(b),
have espoused different rules, some drawn from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts." After eight years of confusion among the lower
courts, the Supreme Court finally has furnished the needed
guidance. In Scindia Steam Navigation CO., Ltd. v. De Los Santos,"
the Court announced that the duty which is owed by the vessel
owner to the maritime worker is reasonable care under the circumstances. The Court in Scindia also elaborated upon what
reasonable care will require under the circumstances normally facing a vessel owner who engages an independent contractor to perform work aboard his vessel. As to conditions existing before the
maritime worker and his employer begin their activities aboard the
vessel, the vessel owner owes the duty of exercising ordinary care
to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert
and experienced maritime employer exercising reasonable care will
be able to carry on its operations with reasonable safety to persons
and property, and to warn the maritime employer of any hazards:
(1) about which the vessel owner knows or should know,
46.

H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in (19721 U.S.

CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4702.

47. See, e.g., Sarauw v. Oceanic Navigation Corp., 622 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1980)
(reasonable care under the circumstances); Johnson v. A/A Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d
334 (1st Cir. 1980) (same); Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Couriers, Ltd., 605 F.2d 438 (9th
Cir. 1979) (same); Lawson v. United States, 605 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1979) (same). See also
Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 343, 343(A (1965)); Evans v. Transporation Maritime Mexicana S.S. Campecke, 639 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1981) (same). See also Anuszewski v.
Dynamic Mariners Corp., Panama, 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TOnTS § 343 (1965)). But see Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d
Cir. 1977) (rejecting applications of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1965));
Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977) (rejecting application of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1965), and applying § 409).
48. 101 S. Ct. 1614 (1981).
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which are likely to be encountered by the maritime
employer in the course of the latter's operations, and
which are not known to the maritime employer and would
not be obvious to a competent maritime employer.

After the maritime employer commences operations, the vessel
owner's duty to exercise reasonable care may be less onerous. He
must continue to exercise such care to avoid injury through
dangerous conditions on those parts of the vessel over which he
maintains active control. Similarly, if he remains actively involved in
the maritime employer's operations, he must continue to exercise
reasonable care to prevent harm to the maritime workers. If he is
not actively involved, however, he owes no duty to supervise the
activities of the maritime employer, unless such a duty is otherwise
imposed upon him by contract, custom or some provision of positive
law. But what if the vessel owner actually discovers that a
dangerous condition has arisen in the area within the maritime
employer's control after such employer has commenced his operations, or he discovers that the maritime employer has failed to take
precautions against injury to his employees from an obviously
dangerous condition existing prior to the commencement of the
employer's activities? The mere fact that the working conditions are
dangerous is not enough to require action on the part of the vessel
owner; maritime employment is by nature dangerous. The issue is
whether the conditions pose an unreasonable risk of danger to a person engaged in a hazardous occupation, and the maritime employer
ordinarily has expertise about reasonably safe ways to do the hazardous work. The majority of the Court would permit the vessel
owner to rely upon that expertise and upon the maritime employer's
obligation to provide his employees with safe working conditions,
and would place upon the vessel owner the duty to interfere only
where the maritime employer's decision to continue working under
dangerous conditions is "obviously improvident."' 9 Three concurring
justices would give the maritime employer less leeway, and would
require that the vessel owner intervene and correct the condition,
or cause it to be corrected, when he has actual knowledge that the
condition is unsafe and a reasonable belief that the maritime
employer will not remedy it.Y
33 U.S.C. § 933(b) provides that acceptance of LSHWCA benefits
under an award operates as an assignment by the maritime worker
to his employer of the worker's right to recover damages against
third persons, unless the worker commences an action against the
49.
50.

Jd. at 1626.
Id. at 1628 (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
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third person within six months after the award of benefits. If the
assignment occurs and the employer successfully prosecutes the
claim, he is entitled to his subrogation rights for benefits he has
paid the worker, together with an additional one-fifth of the
worker's recovery as a "bonus." In some instances, the worker will
fail to bring the action within the six month period, and the
employer thereafter will elect not to seek recovery from the third
person. One situation in which the employer may forego the third
party action is when the third person is a vessel owner or other
maritime enterprise with which the employer does business on a
continuing basis. Another is when the employer's LSHWCA insurer
is the liability insurer of the third party tortfeasor. In such cases,
does the right to sue revert to the the maritime worker? No, says
the Supreme Court; the assignment of the cause of action to the
employer under section 933(b) is total, the Act does not require the
employer to sue the third party, and the claim is not impliedly
reassigned to the maritime worker if the employer fails to sue.'
While the Court rejected the argument that a potential conflict of
interest between the employer and the employee might defeat the
assignment, it acknowledged that there could be such a conflict
which might dictate a different result. It "leaves for another day the
question whether an assignment under [section] 33(b) will bar a ...
[maritime worker's] third-party action if there is specific evidence of
a serious conflict of interest Congress could not have foreseen when
it enacted and amended [section] 33."1s2

DAMAGES
The amount of wages which a worker would have earned in the
remainder of his life is relevant in an action in which he seeks
damages for permanent disability, or in which his beneficiaries seek
recovery for the loss of support he would have provided if he had
not been fatally injured. Although the income which he would have
earned would have been subject to income taxation, the award
received by the worker or his beneficiaries in lieu of such income is
not taxable. Jurisdictions have differed over whether the jury
should be told that the award which they make for loss of future
earnings will not be subject to federal income taxation. Also, a difference of opinion existed as to whether the trier of fact may consider, in determining the amount of lost wages sustained by the
worker, that the wages which the worker would have earned if he
had not been injured would have been in fact subject to income tax51. Rodriquez v. Compass Shipping Co., Ltd., 101 S. Ct. 1945 (1981).
52. 1& at 1958.
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ation. The uncertainty has been removed from maritime law by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Norfolk & Western Railway Co.
v. Liepelt53 in which the Court ruled that as a matter of federal common law, a jury is to be told that the award for loss of earning
capacity or future earnings is not subject to federal income taxation.
Furthermore, in determining the actual earnings or support which
has been lost, the jury may consider the fact that the worker would
have paid taxes on the income he would have earned. That decision
apparently has set the pattern for maritime and state law, but it
may not prevail everywhere the federal sovereign has jurisdiction.
With respect to the Outer Continental Shelf, Congress in 1953
adopted state law as surrogate federal law when no applicable
federal law existed."4 At that time, arguably no federal common law
existed which required the consideration of income tax by the trier
of fact in determining loss of earnings. The intriguing question thus
presented is whether the Supreme Court can establish a federal
common law rule which will supplant state law previously adopted
by Congress as the applicable federal law. The Supreme Court alluded
to, but did not answer that question, in Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
Oil Corp.' The Court remanded the case to the Texas state court for
a determination of whether that state's law did in fact conflict with
the federal common law rule set forth in Liepelt.
Another issue of significance in determining loss of earnings or
support is whether the trier of fact may consider inflation in computing the total amount of the loss. Louisiana permits such evidence,58 but the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected consideration of inflation for such purposes." The latter
court's position was undercut by this dicta in Liepelt:
[Fjederal courts . . . have regarded the future prediction of tax
consequences as too speculative and complex for a jury's deliberations [citing the Fifth Circuit opinion in Johnson v. Penrod
Drilling Co., note 55, supra] .....
Admittedly there are many variables that may affect the
amount of a wage earner's future income tax liability. The law
may change, his family may increase or decrease in size, his
spouse's earnings may affect his tax bracket, and extra income
53. 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
54. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1976).
55. 101 S. Ct. 2870, 2880 (1981).
56. See, e.g., Robinson v. Graves, 332 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Morgan
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), appeal dismissed, 325
So. 2d 282 (La. 1976); Edwards v. Sims, 294 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
57. Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
839 (1975).
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or unforeseen deductions may become available. But future employment itself, future health, future personal expenditures,
future interest rates, and future inflation are also matters of
estimate and prediction. Any one of these issues might provide
the basis for protracted expert testimony and debate. But the
practical wisdom of the trial bar and the trial bench has developed effective methods of presenting the essential elements of an
expert calculation in a form that is understandable by juries
that are increasingly familiar with the complexities of modern
life. We therefore reject the notion that the introduction of evidence describing a decedent's estimated after-tax earnings is too
speculative or complex for a jury."
After Liepelt, panels of the Fifth Circuit initially refused to permit consideration of inflation, maintaining that since the court had
reached its position in Penrod en bane, that position should not be
reversed except by a clear holding of the Supreme Court or an en
bane decision by the Fifth Circuit." En bane rehearings are proceeding at this writing. If inflation evidence becomes generally admissible, as seems certain, Liepelt may have produced little gain for
the defendant, since increases in projected lifetime earnings due to
inflation may offset the decrease resulting from consideration of the
income tax impact upon those earnings.
In American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez," the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the spouse of an injured longshoreman
could recover damages for loss of consortium under the general
maritime tort law. Recovery for such damages under the Jones Act
has been denied, ostensibly on the theory that the Jones Act, except
in death actions, gives a right of action to seamen only.' In Cruz v.
Hendy International Co.,62 the Fifth Circuit ruled that the wife of a
seaman injured through unseaworthiness may recover for her loss of
society, even though such damages may not be recoverable under
the Jones Act. The court also held that the wife is not required to
join her claim for loss of consortium with her husband's personal injury action against the vessel and its owner. The Fifth Circuit's opinion restricts the spouse's damages within narrow limits. Her
recovery may not include the value of the home nursing services she
renders to her spouse, even if she quits work to provide those services. Her damages are limited to "those . . .positive benefits that

would have been rendered

by the physically injured spouse,

58. 100 S. Ct. at 757, 758 (emphasis added).
59. Byrd v. Reederei, 638 F.2d 1300, 1308 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). Culver v. Slater
.Boat Co., 644 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
60. 446 U.S. 274 (1980).
61. Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976).
62. 638 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981).
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specifically delineated in Gaudet and there denominated loss of
society," and do not encompass loss of consortium "as that term is
understood at common law." 3 A federal district court has ruled that
Alvez may not be applied retroactively; if the injury and the wife's
suit arose prior to the Supreme Court decision, the wife has no
cause of action."
WRONGFUL DEATH

Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
clarified the basis of recovery for wrongful death in maritime tort
law. If the victim was a seaman killed through employer negligence,
the Jones Act governs the recovery by the seaman's beneficiaries
against the employer. In all other cases, the applicable law depends
upon where the fatal injury occurred. If the injury causing death occurred within territorial waters, recovery is premised upon the
maritime common law remedy established in Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.," but if the fatal injury takes place on the "high
seas," the wrongful death action is governed by the provisions of
the Death on the High Seas Act."
Another question is the case of a fatal injury inflicted within the
territorial waters of another sovereign, a not uncommon occurrence
in the light of offshore oil development in foreign nations by
American-based companies. One logical argument is that these
waters do not constitute the "high seas," the Death on the High
Seas Act is inapplicable, and the applicable law is a choice between
the law of the foreign sovereign and the maritime common law
remedy prescribed by Moragne. The majority of the lower courts
have not seen it that way, however, and have held that DOHSA applies within foreign territorial waters. The Fifth Circuit in 1981 joined
the majority in its decision in Sanchez v. Loffland Brothers Co."1
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Congress has adopted a three year statute of limitations on suits
"for recovery of damages for personal injury or death, or both, arising out of a maritime tort."" In the same Act, the legislative body
repealed the two year statute of limitations for claims under the
63. Id. at 727.
64. Engle v. A.C. Ellis Corp., 509 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
65. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).

66. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
67. 626 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980). For a discussion of the issue, see Comment, The Death on the High Seas Act: Two Remaining Problems, 41 LA. L. REV.
1214 (1981).
68. Act of Oct. 6. 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-382, 94 Stat. 1525 (repealing 46 U.S.C. § 763
(1976)) (to be codified in 46 U.S.C. § 763(a)).
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Death on the High Seas Act, thus making uniform the prescriptive
period for all maritime wrongful death actions."9
Despite the Act, laches will continue to play an important role in
determining whether stale maritime claims are time-barred, since
the concept remains applicable in property damage claims and in
contract claims. One intriguing question is whether maintenance and
cure and unseaworthiness are "claims arising out of a maritime
tort," or whether they are incidents of the contract of employment
with the shipowner, and thus beyond the reach of the new statute of
limitations. The issue of the retroactive application of the new
statute of limitations seems less difficult; retroactive application is
unlikely, as the first court to reach the issue has held.T
PLATFORM INJURIES
Hundreds of Louisiana workers are employed on stationary platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf, beyond the state's territorial
waters. Since these workers usually do not qualify as seamen, their
compensation claims are governed by the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, pursuant to a special federal statute.7
Tort claims arising on fixed platforms rarely qualify as maritime,
since admiralty law treats the platforms as land; thus a platform
worker's tort claim against a third person usually is governed by
state law.72 Judicial jurisdiction over these third party tort claims
arising on fixed platforms on the Shelf is governed by 43 U.S.C. §
1349(b)(1), which provides in relevant part that "the district courts of
the United States shall have jurisdiction of cases ...

arising out of,

or in connection with (A) any operation conducted on the Outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration, development, or production of the minerals of the subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf ...

.'"' This language does not expressly convey exclusive

jurisdiction to the federal courts. In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil
Corp.,7' the Supreme Court refused to imply exclusive jurisdiction
from the "language, structure, legislative history, or underlying
policies"7 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The Court thus
ruled that federal and state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over actions arising on the Shelf.
69. d. § 2.
70. Bush v. Sumitomo Bank & Trust Co., Ltd., 513 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
71.
72.
73.
74.

43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1978).
43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
101 S.Ct. at 2870.

75. Id. at 2878.

